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Chinua	  Achebe’s	  Biafran	  Story	  
Since	  Arthur	  Ravenscroft	  ’s	  1969	  study	  for	  the	  British	  Council,	  more	  scholarly	  
attention	  has	  been	  concentrated	  on	  Chinua	  Achebe	  than	  on	  any	  other	  African	  
writer.	  	  In	  Achebe	  criticism,	  however,	  there	  has	  always	  been	  a	  sore	  thumb.	  	  
Among	  the	  many	  critical	  studies,	  a	  central	  question	  has	  never	  been	  adequately	  
answered:	  the	  place	  and	  meaning	  of	  Biafra	  for	  Achebe	  and	  his	  work.	  	  With	  the	  
emergence	  of	  his	  Biafran	  war	  memoir	  There	  Was	  a	  Country	  more	  than	  forty	  years	  
after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict,	  the	  significance	  of	  that	  cataclysmic	  experience	  for	  
Achebe	  can	  now	  be	  evaluated.	  	  This	  essay	  attempts	  to	  provide	  such	  an	  	  
assessment	  by	  exploring	  the	  memoir	  alongside	  two	  pieces	  of	  writing	  produced	  
by	  Achebe	  during	  the	  conflict	  itself.	  	  One	  of	  these,	  How	  the	  Leopard	  Got	  His	  Claws,	  
is	  a	  story	  written	  for	  the	  children	  of	  Biafra	  and	  published	  in	  collaboration	  with	  
the	  poet	  Christopher	  Okigbo.	  	  The	  other	  is	  the	  much	  more	  substantial	  and	  
historically	  significant	  project	  that	  Achebe	  worked	  on	  in	  the	  same	  period.	  	  A	  
radical	  political	  manifesto	  for	  Biafra,	  The	  Ahiara	  Declaration	  never	  bore	  Achebe’s	  
name	  as	  lead	  author,	  but	  rather	  that	  of	  the	  Biafran	  leader	  Emeka	  Ojukwu,	  whose	  
defining	  political	  statement	  it	  became.	  	  Little	  examined	  as	  they	  are	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  Achebe	  criticism,	  these	  three	  texts	  do	  much	  to	  illuminate	  the	  significance	  of	  
the	  Biafran	  conflict	  for	  him,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  changed	  his	  own	  sense	  of	  
his	  function	  as	  a	  thinker	  and	  writer.	  
When	  the	  Society	  of	  Nigerian	  Authors	  met	  in	  January	  1966	  to	  honour	  
their	  president	  at	  the	  launch	  of	  his	  fourth	  novel	  A	  Man	  of	  the	  People,	  it	  would	  be	  
difficult	  to	  imagine	  a	  more	  assured	  and	  established	  writer	  than	  Chinua	  Achebe.	  	  	  
From	  the	  young	  media	  professional	  who,	  in	  1957,	  had	  hesitated	  to	  submit	  his	  
first	  novel	  to	  a	  London	  publisher,	  Achebe	  had	  risen	  from	  obscurity	  to	  become	  the	  
most	  celebrated	  author	  in	  Africa.	  	  The	  success	  of	  Things	  Fall	  Apart	  in	  particular—
a	  novel	  that	  would	  sell	  over	  ten	  million	  copies	  and	  inspire	  hundreds	  of	  critical	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studies—is	  well	  documented.	  	  In	  1966,	  Achebe’s	  reputation	  as	  one	  of	  the	  
spearheads	  of	  African	  literary	  development	  did	  not	  only	  stem	  from	  the	  success	  of	  
his	  own	  writings,	  however.	  	  As	  editor	  of	  Heinemann’s	  African	  Writers	  Series,	  he	  
was	  also	  a	  pivotal	  figure	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  new	  post-­‐colonial	  canon	  that	  
had	  already	  begun	  to	  institutionalise	  itself	  across	  anglophone	  Africa.	  According	  
to	  the	  publishing	  entrepreneur	  Alan	  Hill	  in	  his	  memoir	  In	  Pursuit	  of	  Publishing,	  
Heinemann	  at	  that	  time	  lacked	  the	  financial	  muscle	  of	  its	  rivals	  Longman	  and	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  but	  had	  the	  advantage	  that	  it	  was	  much	  more	  reactive	  to	  
the	  demands	  of	  African	  education	  ministries	  and	  examination	  boards,	  in	  the	  
changed	  cultural	  conditions	  of	  Independence.	  	  	  The	  company’s	  campaign	  for	  
hegemony	  over	  the	  education	  market	  in	  Britain’s	  former	  colonies	  hinged	  on	  its	  
ability	  to	  build	  a	  credible	  portfolio	  of	  African	  writing	  suitable	  for	  distribution	  to	  
African	  schools	  and	  colleges,	  and	  it	  was	  Achebe	  they	  relied	  on	  to	  select	  the	  
writers	  and	  solicit	  the	  works	  that	  would	  form	  it.	  
In	  this	  historic	  role,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting,	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  Achebe	  
suffered	  little	  ambivalence	  over	  the	  exercise	  of	  his	  power.	  	  Although	  the	  African	  
Writers	  Series	  was	  supposed	  to	  represent	  African	  writing	  as	  a	  whole,	  from	  the	  
outset	  its	  editor	  strongly	  favoured	  writers	  from	  his	  own	  ethnic	  background.	  	  As	  
Hill	  writes,	  ‘half	  of	  the	  first	  twenty	  English	  language	  novels	  in	  the	  AWS	  were	  
written	  by	  Ibos	  from	  Eastern	  Nigeria’	  (124).	  	  A	  desire	  to	  develop	  writing	  from	  his	  
homeland	  did	  not,	  however,	  prevent	  Achebe	  from	  subjecting	  his	  nation	  to	  a	  hard	  
and	  unsentimental	  examination	  in	  his	  own	  writing.	  	  In	  A	  Man	  of	  the	  People,	  he	  
mounts	  an	  unflinching	  critique	  of	  Nigerian	  public	  life,	  exposing	  the	  weaknesses,	  
narcissism	  and	  corruption	  of	  both	  its	  political	  classes	  and	  intellectuals.	  	  As	  
Achebe	  said	  in	  interview	  with	  Tony	  Hall	  for	  the	  Kenyan	  Sunday	  Nation	  the	  
following	  January:	  
	  
Right	  now	  my	  interest	  is	  in	  politics,	  or	  rather	  my	  interest	  in	  the	  novel	  is	  
politics.	  	  A	  Man	  of	  the	  People	  wasn’t	  a	  flash	  in	  the	  pan.	  	  This	  is	  the	  beginning	  
of	  a	  phase	  for	  me,	  in	  which	  I	  intend	  to	  take	  a	  hard	  look	  at	  what	  we	  in	  Africa	  





As	  this	  interview	  makes	  clear,	  Achebe	  was	  working	  at	  that	  time	  on	  ideas	  for	  a	  
fifth	  novel	  extending	  the	  political	  analysis	  developed	  in	  A	  Man	  of	  the	  People.	  	  
Within	  a	  year,	  however,	  that	  project	  had	  completely	  stalled.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  
twenty	  years	  before	  Achebe	  would	  be	  able	  to	  complete	  another	  novel.	  	  An	  event	  
intervened—the	  Biafran	  War—that	  fundamentally	  disrupted	  his	  writing	  career,	  
re-­‐aligning	  his	  understanding	  of	  nationhood,	  Independence	  and	  the	  condition	  of	  
postcoloniality.	  
	   Beginning	  formally	  in	  July	  1967,	  the	  war	  centred	  over	  the	  decision	  of	  
Nigeria’s	  Igbo-­‐dominated	  Eastern	  Region	  in	  May	  of	  that	  year	  to	  secede	  as	  an	  
independent	  nation.	  	  Over	  the	  previous	  twelve	  months,	  the	  Igbo	  and	  other	  
Easterners	  had	  been	  the	  targets	  of	  a	  campaign	  of	  ethnic	  violence	  which	  extended	  
across	  Nigeria	  and	  which	  was—Achebe	  and	  many	  others	  believed—
systematically	  co-­‐ordinated	  by	  elements	  within	  the	  Nigerian	  establishment.	  	  By	  
the	  time	  of	  secession	  thousands	  of	  Igbo	  business	  people,	  professionals	  and	  their	  
families,	  who	  had	  settled	  outside	  their	  traditional	  homeland	  in	  the	  South	  East,	  
had	  fallen	  victim	  to	  the	  wave	  of	  ethnic	  bigotry.	  	  As	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  violence,	  
reverse	  migration	  on	  a	  mass	  scale	  had	  concentrated	  Easterners	  back	  in	  Igboland	  
and	  its	  surrounding	  territories.	  	  As	  Achebe	  writes	  in	  There	  Was	  a	  Country,	  the	  
governmental	  response	  to	  these	  mass	  ethnic	  pogroms	  was	  one	  of	  brazen	  
inaction.	  	  Among	  the	  Igbo	  themselves,	  suspicion	  was	  fuelled	  that	  a	  Northern	  and	  
Islamic-­‐led	  movement	  was	  underway	  to	  eliminate	  them	  as	  an	  economic	  and	  
political	  force	  in	  Nigeria.	  	  According	  to	  Achebe:	  
	  
Thirty	  thousand	  civilian	  men,	  women,	  and	  children	  were	  slaughtered,	  
hundreds	  of	  thousands	  were	  wounded,	  maimed,	  and	  violated,	  their	  homes	  
and	  property	  looted	  and	  burned—and	  no	  one	  asked	  any	  questions.	  	  A	  
Sierra	  Leonean	  living	  in	  Northern	  Nigeria	  at	  the	  time	  wrote	  home	  in	  
horror:	  ‘The	  killing	  of	  the	  Igbos	  has	  become	  a	  state	  industry	  in	  Nigeria.’	  
What	  terrified	  me	  about	  the	  massacres	  in	  Nigeria	  was	  this:	  If	  it	  was	  only	  
a	  question	  of	  rioting	  in	  the	  streets	  and	  so	  on,	  that	  would	  be	  bad	  enough,	  but	  
it	  could	  be	  explained.	  	  It	  happens	  everywhere	  in	  the	  world.	  But	  in	  this	  
particular	  case	  a	  detailed	  plan	  for	  mass	  killing	  was	  implemented	  by	  the	  
government—the	  army,	  the	  police—the	  very	  people	  who	  were	  there	  to	  
	  
	  
protect	  life	  and	  property.	  	  Not	  a	  single	  person	  has	  been	  punished	  for	  these	  
crimes.	  	  It	  was	  not	  just	  human	  nature,	  a	  case	  of	  somebody	  hating	  his	  
neighbor	  and	  chopping	  off	  his	  head.	  It	  was	  something	  far	  more	  devastating,	  
because	  it	  was	  a	  premeditated	  plan	  that	  involved	  careful	  coordination,	  
awaiting	  only	  the	  right	  spark.	  	  (82-­‐3)	  
	  
During	  the	  civil	  war	  itself,	  as	  his	  memoir	  records,	  a	  further	  three	  million	  Igbo	  
were	  to	  die.	  	  International	  coverage	  of	  Nigeria’s	  offensive	  against	  the	  
secessionists,	  including	  groundbreaking	  photojournalism	  in	  high	  profile	  
publications	  such	  as	  Time	  magazine,	  was	  accompanied	  by	  widespread	  popular	  
protest,	  including	  in	  London,	  calling	  for	  the	  cessation	  of	  hostilities	  and	  the	  
observance	  of	  human	  rights.	  	  A	  key	  focus	  of	  this	  campaign	  was	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  
Harold	  Wilson’s	  Labour	  government	  in	  Britain,	  as	  the	  leading	  supplier	  of	  arms	  to	  
the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Nigeria,	  to	  change	  its	  policy	  of	  active	  support	  for	  what	  
many	  observers	  (including	  Richard	  Nixon)	  described	  as	  a	  campaign	  of	  genocide.	  	  
As	  governmental	  accounts,	  recording	  continuous	  arms	  exports	  from	  Britain	  to	  
Nigeria	  show,	  however,	  this	  campaign	  was	  unsuccessful.	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  highly	  publicised	  effects	  of	  Britain’s	  unwavering	  support	  
for	  Nigeria’s	  war	  was	  the	  total	  blockade	  of	  food	  and	  medical	  supplies	  to	  the	  East	  
that	  it	  made	  possible.	  	  As	  a	  roving	  ambassador	  for	  Biafra,	  frequently	  visiting	  
London	  to	  build	  support	  for	  his	  fledgling	  nation,	  Achebe	  was	  able	  to	  see	  at	  first	  
hand	  the	  intensity	  of	  public	  feeling	  among	  ordinary	  British	  people	  about	  the	  
human	  costs	  of	  the	  British	  policy.	  	  Quite	  clearly,	  Wilson	  was	  willing	  to	  risk	  
significant	  political	  damage	  by	  sustaining	  his	  rigidly	  partisan	  stance.	  	  Within	  the	  
Wilson	  administration,	  as	  I	  will	  show,	  concern	  was	  certainly	  voiced	  about	  the	  
rightness	  of	  British	  policy,	  but	  publically,	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  UK	  government	  
to	  aid	  Nigeria	  in	  its	  goal	  of	  crushing	  the	  Biafrans	  was	  unwavering.	  	  As	  Achebe	  
writes:	  
	  
Harold	  Wilson's	  government	  soon	  found	  itself	  awash	  in	  a	  public	  relations	  
nightmare	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  Wilson	  personally	  accused	  Ojukwu	  of	  
attempting	  to	  garner	  sympathy	  by	  exploiting	  the	  casualties	  of	  a	  war	  to	  
which	  his	  government	  was	  supplying	  arms!	  	  The	  bombing	  of	  civilian	  targets	  
	  
	  
in	  Biafra	  by	  the	  Nigerian	  air	  force	  made	  the	  evening	  news	  and	  appeared	  in	  
the	  major	  newspapers	  in	  Great	  Britain	  and	  ‘stirred	  a	  hornet's	  nest’	  of	  
outrage	  from	  the	  British	  people.	  Things	  were	  so	  tense	  that	  British	  
dockworkers	  reportedly	  refused	  to	  load	  ships	  with	  British	  arms	  heading	  
for	  Lagos,	  protesting	  that	  they	  were	  being	  used	  to	  kill	  ‘Biafran	  babies.’	  
(100-­‐1)	  
	  
During	  the	  course	  of	  the	  conflict,	  there	  is	  little	  dispute	  over	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  vast	  
majority—over	  two	  and	  a	  half	  million—of	  the	  victims	  of	  Nigeria’s	  blockade	  of	  
Biafra	  were	  children	  who	  died	  of	  malnutrition-­‐related	  illnesses	  such	  as	  
kwashiorkor	  or	  of	  outright	  starvation.	  	  As	  Achebe	  suggests,	  moreover,	  there	  is	  no	  
doubt	  that	  Wilson’s	  administration	  ran	  the	  gauntlet	  of	  public	  opinion	  by	  
continuing	  to	  encourage	  and	  facilitate	  the	  Nigerian	  action.	  	  One	  of	  the	  responses	  
by	  Biafra	  itself	  to	  this	  apparently	  genocidal	  campaign	  was	  to	  provide	  
unprecedented	  access	  to	  the	  international	  media,	  so	  that	  the	  horrific	  impact	  of	  
the	  conflict	  on	  civilians	  could	  be	  publicised.	  	  Another	  important	  response,	  
however,	  was	  to	  attempt	  to	  capture	  the	  political	  high	  ground	  by	  promulgating	  a	  
defence	  of	  Biafra’s	  legitimacy	  as	  an	  independent	  nation,	  in	  a	  formal	  statement	  of	  
principles.	  This	  statement,	  The	  Ahiara	  Declaration,	  was	  delivered	  as	  an	  address	  
by	  the	  Biafran	  Head	  of	  State	  Emeka	  Ojukwu	  and	  published	  under	  his	  name	  in	  
June	  1969.	  	  Achebe,	  however,	  was	  in	  fact	  its	  lead	  author,	  as	  his	  memoir	  reveals.	  	  
In	  the	  winter	  of	  1968,	  Achebe	  writes,	  he	  was	  asked	  by	  Ojukwu	  to	  convene	  
a	  group	  of	  writers	  and	  intellectuals	  to	  examine	  the	  cultural	  and	  political	  
dimensions	  of	  Biafra’s	  attempt	  to	  ‘free	  itself	  from	  the	  faults	  it	  saw	  in	  Nigeria’	  
(143).	  	  The	  questions	  the	  group	  set	  itself	  to	  answer	  were	  lofty	  indeed:	  ‘How	  
would	  we	  win	  this	  war	  and	  begin	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  nation	  with	  the	  qualities	  
we	  seek?	  	  What	  did	  we	  want	  Biafra	  to	  look	  like?	  	  What	  would	  be	  the	  core	  
components	  of	  our	  new	  nation-­‐state?	  	  What	  did	  we	  mean	  by	  citizenship	  and	  
nationhood?	  	  What	  would	  be	  Biafra’s	  relationship	  to	  other	  African	  countries?	  	  
What	  kind	  of	  education	  would	  the	  general	  population	  need	  to	  aid	  Biafra’s	  
development?’	  (143-­‐4).	  	  There	  Was	  a	  Country	  includes	  no	  detailed	  record	  of	  the	  
exchanges	  that	  took	  place	  within	  this	  group.	  	  That	  its	  discussions	  were	  bold	  and	  
productive	  is,	  however,	  clearly	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  having	  heard	  its	  initial	  
	  
	  
findings,	  Ojukwu	  asked	  Achebe	  to	  set	  up	  and	  chair	  a	  powerful	  governmental	  
body,	  the	  National	  Guidance	  Committee,	  to	  write	  a	  constitution	  for	  Biafra.	  	  The	  
document	  Achebe	  and	  his	  colleagues	  produced,	  The	  Ahiara	  Declaration,	  was	  
designed	  to	  be	  ‘a	  promulgation	  of	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  upon	  which	  the	  
government	  and	  people	  of	  Biafra	  would	  operate’	  (144).	  	  Achebe’s	  brief	  from	  the	  
Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  was	  clear.	  	  ‘The	  Biafran	  nation,	  Ojukwu	  explained,	  had	  to	  
have	  special	  attributes—the	  very	  principles	  that	  we	  approved	  of	  and	  were	  
fighting	  for:	  unity,	  self-­‐determination,	  social	  justice,	  etc.	  	  The	  final	  version	  of	  this	  
document,	  we	  hoped,	  would	  also	  tell	  our	  story	  to	  the	  world—how	  Biafra	  had	  
been	  pushed	  out	  of	  Nigeria	  by	  Nigerians	  and	  threatened	  with	  genocide’	  (144).	  
	   In	  the	  Declaration,	  Britain’s	  implacable	  determination	  to	  guarantee	  
overwhelming	  military	  superiority	  for	  Nigeria	  is	  analyzed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  simple	  
equation.	  	  For	  Wilson’s	  government,	  it	  suggests,	  the	  claims	  of	  basic	  economic	  
self-­‐interest,	  and	  especially	  an	  obsession	  with	  protecting	  Britain’s	  oil	  rights	  in	  
the	  Niger	  Delta,	  simply	  outweighed	  humanitarian	  concerns	  about	  the	  Igbo	  
genocide.	  	  This	  attitude	  is	  set	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  British	  establishment’s	  long	  
track	  record	  of	  perpetrating	  or	  permitting	  mass	  violence	  in	  the	  furtherance	  of	  its	  
material	  ambitions.	  	  ‘The	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  British	  committed	  genocide	  against	  the	  
American	  Indians.	  	  They	  committed	  genocide	  against	  the	  Caribbs.	  .	  .	  .	  	  They	  
committed	  genocide	  against	  the	  native	  Tasmanians	  and	  the	  Maoris	  of	  New	  
Zealand.	  	  During	  the	  era	  of	  the	  slave	  trade,	  they	  topped	  the	  list	  and	  led	  the	  
genocidal	  attempt	  against	  the	  Negro	  race	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Today,	  they	  are	  engaged	  in	  
committing	  genocide	  against	  us’	  (18).	  	  Here,	  racial	  arrogance	  is	  seen	  as	  providing	  
the	  framework	  for	  Britain’s	  remorseless	  pursuit	  of	  its	  own	  advantage,	  both	  in	  the	  
colonial	  era	  and	  afterwards.	  	  In	  the	  current	  context,	  however,	  the	  motivation	  for	  
its	  proxy	  war	  against	  Biafra	  is	  ascribed	  to	  a	  much	  more	  specific	  concern—fear	  of	  
losing	  control	  of	  its	  strategically	  crucial	  oil	  interests	  in	  the	  region.	  	  ‘We	  now	  see	  
why	  in	  spite	  of	  Britain’s	  tottering	  economy	  Harold	  Wilson’s	  government	  insists	  
on	  financing	  Nigeria’s	  futile	  war	  against	  us.	  	  We	  see	  why	  the	  Shell-­‐BP	  led	  the	  
Nigerian	  hoards	  into	  Bonny,	  pays	  Biafran	  oil	  royalties	  to	  Nigeria;	  and	  provided	  
the	  Nigerian	  army	  with	  all	  the	  help	  it	  needed.	  .	  .	  .	  	  We	  see	  why	  the	  oil	  and	  trading	  
companies	  in	  Nigeria	  still	  finance	  this	  war	  and	  why	  they	  risk	  the	  life	  and	  limb	  of	  
their	  staff	  in	  the	  war	  zones’	  (16).	  	  Against	  Britain’s	  violent	  pursuit	  of	  neo-­‐colonial	  
	  
	  
self-­‐interest,	  Biafra’s	  resistance	  is	  represented	  as	  embodying	  the	  true	  spirit	  of	  
independence:	  
	  
Our	  struggle	  has	  far-­‐reaching	  significance.	  	  It	  is	  the	  latest	  recrudescence	  
in	  our	  time	  of	  the	  age-­‐old	  struggle	  of	  the	  Black	  man	  for	  his	  full	  stature	  as	  
man.	  	  We	  are	  the	  latest	  victims	  of	  a	  wicked	  collusion	  between	  the	  three	  
traditional	  scourges	  of	  the	  black	  man—racism,	  Arab	  Muslim	  
expansionism	  and	  white	  economic	  imperialism.	  	  Playing	  subsidiary	  role	  is	  
Bolshevik	  Russia	  seeking	  for	  a	  place	  in	  the	  African	  sun.	  	  Our	  struggle	  is	  a	  
total	  and	  vehement	  rejection	  of	  all	  those	  evils	  which	  blighted	  Nigeria,	  
evils	  which	  were	  bound	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  disintegration	  of	  that	  ill-­‐fated	  
federation.	  .	  .	  .	  	  It	  is	  a	  positive	  commitment	  to	  build	  a	  healthy,	  dynamic	  and	  
progressive	  state	  such	  as	  would	  be	  the	  pride	  of	  black	  men	  the	  world	  over.	  
(7)	  
	  
Throughout,	  the	  Declaration	  is	  bold	  in	  its	  insistence	  that	  the	  real	  struggle	  is	  not	  
against	  Nigeria,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  Nigerian	  troops	  that	  daily	  threatened	  the	  lives	  of	  
the	  people.	  	  The	  real	  target	  of	  the	  Biafran	  revolution,	  instead,	  is	  the	  abject	  
condition	  of	  neo-­‐colonial	  subordination	  that	  Nigeria	  represents.	  	  ‘Nigeria	  is	  a	  
stooge	  of	  Europe.	  	  Her	  independence	  was	  and	  is	  a	  lie’	  (18).	  	  For	  the	  British,	  
concerned	  with	  nothing	  except	  the	  development	  of	  their	  oil	  interests,	  it	  suggests,	  
only	  one	  model	  of	  Nigerian	  self-­‐government	  could	  ever	  have	  been	  acceptable,	  
that	  of	  a	  ‘corrupt	  and	  rickety	  structure	  .	  .	  .	  in	  a	  perpetual	  state	  of	  powerlessness	  
to	  check	  foreign	  exploitation’	  (14).	  
In	  his	  account	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  civil	  war	  in	  There	  Was	  a	  Country,	  Achebe	  
captures	  the	  growing	  sense	  of	  fear	  among	  Biafrans	  during	  the	  conflict,	  not	  only	  
related	  to	  their	  (ultimately	  unsuccessful)	  struggles	  to	  defend	  against	  the	  
seemingly	  endless	  military	  resources	  poured	  in	  by	  Britain	  against	  them,	  but	  also	  
the	  belief	  that	  the	  endpoint	  towards	  which	  the	  war	  was	  driving	  was	  the	  
extermination	  of	  the	  Igbo.	  	  In	  the	  international	  media,	  this	  belief	  was	  openly	  





One	  word	  now	  describes	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  military	  government	  
towards	  secessionist	  Biafra:	  genocide.	  	  It	  is	  ugly	  and	  extreme	  but	  it	  is	  the	  
only	  word	  which	  fits	  Nigeria’s	  decision	  to	  stop	  the	  International	  Committee	  
of	  the	  Red	  Cross,	  and	  other	  relief	  agencies,	  from	  flying	  food	  to	  Biafra.	  (There	  
Was	  a	  Country,	  230)	  
	  
By	  the	  time	  the	  war	  reached	  its	  mid-­‐point,	  the	  view	  that	  a	  campaign	  of	  genocide	  
was	  being	  waged	  against	  the	  Igbo	  in	  Biafra	  had	  become	  widely	  accepted	  in	  the	  
US.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  1968	  it	  became	  one	  of	  the	  keynotes	  of	  Nixon’s	  campaign	  for	  the	  
presidency,	  as	  he	  struggled	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  black	  vote.	  	  
Achebe’s	  memoir	  points	  to	  an	  address	  given	  by	  Nixon	  on	  10	  September	  of	  that	  
year:	  
	  
Until	  now	  efforts	  to	  relieve	  the	  Biafran	  people	  have	  been	  thwarted	  by	  the	  
desire	  of	  the	  central	  government	  of	  Nigeria	  to	  pursue	  total	  and	  
unconditional	  victory	  and	  by	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  Ibo	  [sic]	  people	  that	  surrender	  
means	  wholesale	  atrocities	  and	  genocide.	  But	  genocide	  is	  what	  is	  taking	  
place	  right	  now—and	  starvation	  is	  the	  grim	  reaper.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  time	  to	  
stand	  on	  ceremony,	  or	  to	  'go	  through	  channels'	  or	  to	  observe	  the	  
diplomatic	  niceties.	  The	  destruction	  of	  an	  entire	  people	  is	  an	  immoral	  
objective	  even	  in	  the	  most	  moral	  of	  wars.	  It	  can	  never	  be	  justified;	  it	  can	  
never	  be	  condoned.	  (231)	  
	  
In	  Achebe’s	  writings	  both	  of	  the	  period	  and	  subsequently,	  however,	  the	  question	  
of	  genocide	  is	  unfailingly	  connected	  to	  that	  of	  oil.	  	  In	  ‘1966,’	  the	  poem	  that	  
introduces	  his	  1972	  collection	  Beware	  Soul	  Brother,	  for	  example,	  images	  of	  oil	  
prospecting	  merge	  strikingly	  with	  ideas	  of	  coming	  violence	  and	  death,	  to	  the	  
point	  at	  which	  they	  are	  entirely	  inseparable:	  
	  
slowly	  downward	  in	  remote	  
subterranean	  shaft	  
a	  diamond-­‐tipped	  
drillpoint	  crept	  closer	  
	  
	  
to	  residual	  chaos	  to	  
rare	  artesian	  hatred.	  .	  .	  	  
	  
In	  Biafra	  it	  was	  common	  knowledge	  that	  after	  half	  a	  century	  of	  unsuccessful	  
exploration,	  commercially	  exploitable	  reserves	  of	  crude	  oil	  had	  been	  discovered	  
in	  1956	  in	  Olibiri	  in	  the	  Niger	  Delta,	  and	  that	  this	  had	  marking	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  
Britain’s	  colonial	  attitude	  towards	  the	  region.	  	  As	  Phia	  Steyn	  	  writes	  in	  an	  essay	  
on	  early	  exploration	  efforts,	  the	  promise	  of	  significant	  oil	  production	  in	  South	  
Eastern	  Nigeria	  had	  attracted	  intense	  interest	  among	  Western	  European	  powers	  
in	  the	  late	  1950s,	  primarily	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  it	  was	  regarded	  as	  being	  ‘on	  the	  
“right	  side”	  of	  the	  Suez	  canal’	  (266-­‐7).	  	  During	  the	  Suez	  crisis	  of	  1956,	  it	  had	  
become	  clear	  to	  Britain	  and	  others	  that	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  oil	  supplies	  from	  the	  
Persian	  Gulf	  was	  a	  major	  strategic	  weakness.	  	  From	  that	  period,	  therefore,	  rapid	  
development	  of	  oil	  production	  in	  Nigeria	  by	  British	  Petroleum,	  alongside	  the	  
Dutch	  owned	  multinational	  now	  known	  as	  Shell	  Oil,	  became	  a	  political	  as	  well	  as	  
an	  economic	  priority.	  
	   As	  a	  retrospective	  on	  the	  conflict	  in	  Time	  magazine	  in	  1970	  bluntly	  put	  it:	  
‘Oil	  fuelled	  the	  Nigerian	  civil	  war.	  The	  major	  fields	  were	  in	  what	  was	  Biafra,	  and	  
on	  them	  rested	  the	  region's	  hopes	  of	  sustaining	  an	  independent	  economy’	  (76).	  
In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  that	  from	  a	  British	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  
secession	  of	  Nigeria’s	  South	  East	  as	  the	  republic	  of	  Biafra	  in	  1967	  implied	  a	  clear	  
potential	  threat	  to	  its	  interests.	  	  As	  British	  Foreign	  Office	  records	  from	  the	  period	  
show,	  early	  Biafran	  successes	  in	  over-­‐running	  the	  Nigerian	  mid-­‐West	  in	  the	  
name	  of	  true	  independence	  for	  Africans—with	  an	  advance	  on	  Lagos	  their	  next	  
strategic	  priority—strongly	  intensified	  those	  concerns.	  	  In	  Achebe’s	  words	  in	  
There	  Was	  a	  Country,	  ‘[a]t	  first	  Biafra	  was	  successful	  and	  this	  alarmed	  Britain,	  the	  
former	  colonial	  power,	  anxious	  for	  its	  big	  oil	  holdings’	  (100).	  	  Within	  the	  Wilson	  
government,	  it	  was	  resolved	  that	  Britain’s	  best	  interests	  lay	  with	  supporting	  
Nigeria,	  the	  former	  dominion	  over	  whom	  it	  retained	  a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  
influence,	  rather	  than	  Biafra,	  whose	  well-­‐publicized	  commitment	  to	  shedding	  the	  
neo-­‐colonial	  yolk	  promised	  political	  and	  commercial	  difficulties.	  	  Almost	  from	  
the	  beginning	  of	  the	  conflict,	  against	  both	  public	  opposition	  and	  dissent	  from	  
within	  the	  establishment	  in	  London,	  arms	  and	  ammunition	  began	  to	  flow	  in	  
	  
	  
historically	  unprecedented	  quantities	  from	  Britain	  to	  the	  Nigerian	  Federation.	  	  
As	  George	  (later	  Baron)	  Thomson	  at	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  wrote	  in	  secret	  and	  still	  
unpublished	  correspondence	  sent	  on	  4	  December	  1967to	  Denis	  (later	  Baron)	  
Healey	  in	  his	  role	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Defence,	  the	  sheer	  scale	  of	  demands	  on	  
British	  military	  reserves	  and	  arms	  manufacturers	  represented	  a	  major	  challenge	  
for	  the	  UK	  at	  that	  time.	  	  Arming	  Nigeria	  as	  vigorously	  as	  possible,	  however,	  
promised	  several	  strategic	  advantages.	  	  	  ‘I	  realize	  that	  a	  sudden	  demand	  of	  this	  
kind	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  meet,	  but	  as	  I	  see	  it	  .	  .	  .	  it	  would	  be	  greatly	  to	  our	  
advantage	  to	  do	  whatever	  we	  can	  to	  meet	  it,’	  Thomson	  writes.	  	  Firstly,	  no	  serious	  
dissent	  was	  envisaged	  within	  Wilson’s	  cabinet	  in	  the	  face	  of	  economic	  priorities	  
which	  had	  been	  well	  aired.	  	  Secondly,	  the	  initial	  ‘shopping	  list’	  of	  arms	  received	  
from	  Nigeria	  contained	  only	  requests	  for	  vehicles,	  shells	  and	  bullets,	  as	  opposed	  
to	  less	  easily	  justifiable	  items	  such	  as	  war	  planes.	  As	  Thomson	  then	  goes	  on:	  
	  
(c)	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  F.	  M.	  G.	  [Federal	  Government	  of	  Nigeria]	  
have	  had	  their	  fingers	  burned	  in	  other	  countries,	  and	  a	  favourable	  
response	  	  .	  .	  .	  ought	  to	  give	  us	  every	  chance	  of	  establishing	  ourselves	  
again	  as	  the	  main	  supplier	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  forces	  after	  the	  war	  .	  .	  .	  the	  
Nigerian	  economy	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  recover	  and	  start	  to	  expand	  
again,	  and	  there	  should	  be	  valuable	  business	  to	  be	  done.	  	  	  	  
	  
(d)	  	  Anything	  that	  we	  can	  do	  to	  assist	  the	  F.	  M.	  G.	  should	  help	  our	  oil	  
companies	  to	  re-­‐establish	  and	  expand	  their	  activities	  in	  Nigeria.	  
	  
An	  initial	  strategic	  priority	  was	  to	  regain	  the	  oil-­‐producing	  areas	  themselves	  
from	  Biafran	  control.	  	  Once	  that	  was	  accomplished,	  a	  circular	  arrangement	  was	  
established	  whereby	  Britain	  would	  pay	  revenues	  for	  oil	  it	  extracted	  in	  former	  
Biafran	  territory	  to	  Lagos,	  which	  then	  used	  these	  funds	  to	  pay	  for	  British	  military	  
ordnance.	  
While	  it	  cannot	  be	  said	  that	  Wilson’s	  government	  pursued	  this	  policy	  
entirely	  without	  compunction,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  ethical	  misgivings	  voiced	  in	  
London	  were	  insufficient	  to	  change	  government	  policy.	  	  As	  Foreign	  Office	  
	  
	  
minister	  Maurice	  Foley	  	  wrote	  in	  an	  unpublished	  letter	  to	  John	  (later	  Baron)	  
Morris	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  in	  January	  1969:	  
	  
We	  are	  none	  of	  us	  happy	  about	  having	  to	  go	  on	  providing	  arms	  	  and	  
ammunition	  to	  Nigeria	  while	  the	  civil	  war	  continues	  with	  no	  immediate	  
end	  in	  sight	  but	  the	  alternative	  is	  to	  set	  ourselves	  on	  the	  slippery	  slope	  
towards	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  very	  extensive	  British	  interests	  in	  Nigeria.	  	  
	  
On	  13	  November	  1968,	  in	  an	  unpublished	  letter	  to	  Lord	  Malcolm	  Shepherd	  at	  the	  
Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office	  Morris	  had	  confirmed	  the	  supply	  of	  a	  further	  
6	  Saladin	  armoured	  cars,	  20,000	  76mm	  artillery	  shells	  and	  15,000,000	  additional	  
rounds	  of	  ammunition	  for	  small	  arms.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  that	  year,	  he	  records,	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Defence	  had	  supplied	  armaments	  to	  the	  Nigerian	  Federation	  
‘equivalent	  to	  60%	  of	  the	  British	  Army’s	  total	  reserve	  stocks	  to	  meet	  its	  world-­‐
wide	  liabilities’	  even	  though,	  as	  he	  explicitly	  acknowledges,	  there	  had	  not	  been	  
‘any	  objective	  assessment	  .	  .	  .	  whether	  these	  munitions	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  
conclusive	  factor	  in	  ending	  the	  fighting	  in	  Nigeria’.	  Associated	  correspondence	  
between	  officials	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  does	  evidence	  debate	  within	  
governmental	  circles	  in	  the	  face	  of	  public	  revulsion	  at	  the	  apparently	  genocidal	  
offensive	  Britain	  was	  supporting.	  	  On	  22	  Jan	  1969,	  Morris’s	  stance	  is	  discussed	  in	  
internal	  correspondence	  between	  the	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office	  and	  the	  
Office	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defence.	  	  	  In	  a	  secret	  memo,	  an	  unnamed	  aide	  warns	  that	  
the	  minister	  was	  ‘becoming	  increasingly	  restive	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  
arms	  and	  ammunition	  to	  Nigeria	  [and]	  is	  now	  muttering	  darkly	  about	  either	  
writing	  or	  going	  to	  see	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  himself.’	  In	  revealing	  commentary,	  
Morris’s	  concern	  is	  assessed	  by	  the	  civil	  servant	  as	  being	  ‘a	  mixture	  of	  genuine	  
moral	  indignation	  against	  what	  he	  considers	  to	  be	  an	  old	  colonialist	  policy	  on	  
our	  part,	  the	  ‘Conscience	  of	  the	  Left,’	  irritation	  with	  the	  inept	  way	  in	  which	  the	  
Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office	  seems	  to	  be	  handling	  this	  subject	  (this	  is	  fully	  
justified),	  and	  a	  wish	  to	  make	  a	  political	  splash	  on	  his	  own	  account.’	  	  In	  the	  same	  
communication,	  a	  candid	  assessment	  is	  made	  of	  Britain’s	  expected	  gains	  from	  




Present	  British	  policy	  seems	  to	  be	  to	  provide	  conventional	  weapons	  and	  
ammunition	  to	  Nigeria	  (on	  a	  rather	  more	  lavish	  scale	  than	  we	  would	  
probably	  be	  keen	  to	  admit	  in	  public),	  in	  the	  knowledge	  that	  while	  this	  is	  not	  
doing	  very	  much	  towards	  bringing	  the	  war	  to	  an	  end,	  Nigeria	  could	  almost	  
certainly	  buy	  the	  stuff	  somewhere	  else	  if	  we	  didn’t	  provide	  it,	  and	  by	  letting	  
her	  have	  it	  we	  retain	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  influence	  in	  Lagos	  and	  the	  
possibility	  of	  emerging	  with	  good	  relations	  when	  Nigeria	  ultimately	  wins,	  
thereby	  ensuring	  access	  to	  the	  oil	  reserves	  in	  East	  Nigeria.	  	  
	  
Correspondence	  from	  John	  Morris	  to	  Lord	  Malcolm	  Shepherd,	  Minister	  of	  State	  
at	  the	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office	  and	  copied	  to	  Harold	  Wilson	  as	  Prime	  
Minister,	  conveys	  the	  same	  impression:	  that	  political	  disquiet	  over	  the	  genocidal	  
scale	  of	  the	  campaign	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  over-­‐ride	  commercial	  interests.	  
The	  position	  of	  Dennis	  Healey	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Defence,	  the	  records	  
suggest,	  was	  that	  it	  was	  not	  his	  role	  to	  question	  the	  ethical	  implications	  of	  his	  
ministry’s	  own	  arms	  deals.	  	  As	  his	  parliamentary	  secretary	  J.	  F.	  Mayne	  writes	  on	  
12	  November	  1968,	  in	  a	  confidential	  note	  explicitly	  setting	  out	  the	  Secretary	  of	  
State’s	  position	  to	  his	  colleagues	  at	  the	  Foreign	  Office,	  ‘Our	  role	  in	  any	  arms	  deal	  
with	  Nigeria	  is	  that	  of	  supplying	  agents;	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  we	  ought	  or	  
ought	  not	  to	  supply	  is	  one	  for	  the	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Secretary	  to	  
defend.’	  
On	  the	  ground	  four	  thousand	  miles	  to	  the	  south,	  the	  perceptions	  of	  
Achebe	  and	  his	  contemporaries	  could	  hardly	  have	  been	  more	  different.	  	  Although	  
Biafra	  was	  covertly	  assisted	  by	  airdrops	  from	  France	  and	  a	  few	  other	  allies,	  their	  
defensive	  resources	  were	  dwarfed	  by	  the	  massive	  inflow	  of	  arms	  from	  Britain	  to	  
the	  Nigerian	  Federation.	  	  By	  1969,	  using	  aircraft	  purchased	  from	  the	  Soviet	  
Union,	  British	  artillery	  and	  armoured	  vehicles,	  and	  guided	  by	  tactical	  advice	  
from	  British	  officers	  on	  the	  ground,	  Nigeria	  had	  effected	  a	  complete	  land	  siege	  of	  
the	  rebel	  territories.	  	  For	  Achebe	  and	  his	  family	  as	  Nigerian	  soldiers	  drew	  closer,	  
as	  ‘horrendous	  stories’	  spread	  ‘of	  nurses	  and	  local	  women	  being	  raped	  and	  
violated	  in	  unthinkable	  ways’	  (200),	  Britain’s	  implacable	  pursuit	  of	  diplomatic	  
and	  commercial	  advantage	  was	  felt	  in	  the	  most	  visceral	  way.	  	  While	  in	  London	  
Morris,	  Foley,	  Healey	  and	  Wilson	  danced	  around	  each	  other	  resolving,	  by	  default,	  
	  
	  
to	  facilitate	  and	  underwrite	  Nigeria’s	  war	  against	  the	  secessionists,	  Achebe’s	  
account	  brings	  home	  the	  human	  experience	  of	  that	  policy:	  
	  
Gowon	  had	  succeeded	  in	  cutting	  Biafra	  off	  from	  the	  sea,	  robbing	  its	  
inhabitants	  of	  shipping	  ports	  to	  receive	  military	  and	  humanitarian	  supplies.	  
The	  afflictions	  marasmus	  and	  kwashiorkor	  began	  to	  spread	  farther,	  with	  
the	  absence	  of	  protein	  in	  the	  diet,	  and	  they	  were	  compounded	  by	  outbreaks	  
of	  other	  disease	  epidemics	  and	  diarrhea.	  The	  landscape	  was	  filled	  by	  an	  
increasing	  number	  of	  those	  avian	  prognosticators	  of	  death	  as	  the	  famine	  
worsened	  and	  the	  death	  toll	  mounted:	  udene,	  the	  vultures.	  By	  the	  beginning	  
of	  the	  dry	  season	  of	  1968,	  Biafran	  civilians	  and	  soldiers	  alike	  were	  starving.	  
Bodies	  lay	  rotting	  under	  the	  hot	  sun	  by	  the	  roadside,	  and	  the	  flapping	  
wings	  of	  scavengers	  could	  be	  seen	  circling,	  waiting,	  watching	  patiently	  
nearby.	  Some	  estimates	  are	  that	  over	  a	  thousand	  Biafrans	  a	  day	  were	  
perishing	  by	  this	  time,	  and	  at	  the	  height	  of	  Gowon's	  economic	  blockade	  and	  
‘starve	  them	  into	  submission’	  policy,	  upward	  of	  fifty	  thousand	  Biafran	  
civilians,	  most	  of	  them	  babies,	  children,	  and	  women,	  were	  dying	  every	  
single	  month.	  (210)	  
	  
For	  Achebe,	  an	  intellectual	  who	  had	  freely	  partaken	  of	  the	  optimism	  of	  
Independence	  in	  1960,	  when	  Nigeria	  had	  seemed	  to	  shake	  itself	  free	  from	  the	  
bonds	  of	  colonialism,	  Biafra	  was	  a	  life-­‐changing	  event.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  his	  memoir	  he	  
calls	  the	  civil	  war	  ‘a	  cataclysmic	  experience	  that	  changed	  the	  history	  of	  Africa’	  
(2).	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  Nigeria	  and	  many	  of	  its	  writers	  and	  intellectuals	  
had	  begun	  to	  change	  long	  before	  Biafra’s	  secession,	  however.	  	  In	  Achebe’s	  own	  
case,	  it	  was	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  that	  he	  began	  to	  perceive	  that	  Britain,	  the	  former	  
colonial	  power	  had	  ‘made	  certain	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  their	  departure	  that	  power	  went	  
to	  that	  conservative	  element	  in	  the	  country	  that	  had	  played	  no	  real	  part	  in	  the	  
struggle	  for	  independence’	  (52).	  	  Achebe’s	  own	  protest	  at	  the	  progressive	  
dissolution	  of	  political	  dialogue	  in	  postcolonial	  Nigeria	  was	  embodied	  by	  his	  
1966	  novel	  A	  Man	  of	  the	  People,	  which	  partly	  dramatised	  the	  corrupt	  and	  
increasingly	  tribalist	  struggle	  for	  power	  in	  Lagos	  during	  the	  elections	  of	  1964	  
and	  1965.	  	  The	  novel,	  even	  more	  than	  its	  predecessor	  No	  Longer	  at	  Ease,	  reads	  as	  
	  
	  
a	  desperate	  call	  for	  Nigerians	  to	  take	  charge	  of	  their	  destiny	  and	  resist	  the	  forces	  
pushing	  their	  nation	  towards	  ruin.	  	  In	  theatre,	  Wole	  Soyinka’s	  work	  was	  striking	  
similarly	  anguished	  chords.	  	  In	  an	  essay	  on	  his	  work,	  the	  playwright	  and	  novelist	  
Femi	  Osofisan	  describes	  being	  driven	  as	  a	  schoolboy	  to	  University	  College	  Ibadan	  
to	  witness	  a	  series	  of	  political	  revues	  staged	  under	  the	  prescient	  title	  Before	  the	  
Blackout.	  	  In	  a	  feverish	  atmosphere,	  he	  says	  ‘I	  was	  captivated	  the	  fierce	  satirical	  
portraits	  that	  Soyinka	  drew	  of	  well-­‐known	  public	  figures,	  especially	  at	  that	  
period	  in	  mid-­‐1965,	  when	  the	  horrors	  of	  our	  politics	  were	  beginning	  to	  escalate’	  
(176).	  	  In	  Achebe’s	  analysis,	  artists	  and	  authors	  in	  this	  period	  were	  confronted	  
with	  an	  unpalatable	  but	  inescapable	  problem.	  	  ‘They	  found	  that	  the	  
independence	  they	  had	  won	  was	  totally	  without	  content.	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Dr.	  
Nnamdi	  Azikiwe,	  Nigeria	  was	  given	  her	  freedom	  ‘on	  a	  platter	  of	  gold.’	  	  We	  should	  
have	  known	  that	  freedom	  should	  be	  won,	  not	  given	  on	  a	  plate’	  (52).	  
In	  Frantz	  Fanon’s	  work	  of	  the	  same	  period	  (The	  Wretched	  of	  the	  Earth	  was	  
published	  in	  1961	  but	  not	  in	  an	  English	  edition	  until	  1965),	  intellectuals	  in	  
formerly	  colonised	  African	  countries	  are	  castigated	  along	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
black	  middle	  class	  for	  their	  lack	  of	  commitment	  to	  genuine	  national	  renewal.	  	  
Very	  much	  as	  Achebe	  suggests	  in	  A	  Man	  of	  the	  People,	  Fanon	  laments	  the	  lack	  of	  
political	  understanding	  and	  commitment	  among	  the	  bourgeoisie	  in	  the	  newly	  
independent	  nations,	  whose	  ‘innermost	  vocation	  seems	  to	  be	  to	  keep	  in	  the	  
running	  and	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  racket’	  (120).	  	  The	  educated	  class,	  which	  should	  put	  
its	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  the	  people,	  in	  fact	  has	  ‘nothing	  more	  
than	  an	  approximate,	  bookish	  acquaintance’	  (121)	  with	  their	  new	  nation	  and	  its	  
resources.	  	  As	  The	  Wretched	  of	  the	  Earth	  goes	  on	  to	  argue:	  
	  
Since	  the	  middle	  class	  has	  neither	  sufficient	  material	  nor	  intellectual	  
resources	  .	  .	  .	  it	  limits	  its	  claims	  to	  the	  taking	  over	  of	  business	  offices	  and	  
commercial	  houses	  formerly	  occupied	  by	  the	  settlers.	  	  The	  national	  
bourgeoisie	  steps	  into	  the	  shoes	  of	  the	  former	  European	  settlement:	  
doctors,	  barristers,	  traders,	  commercial	  travellers,	  general	  agents	  and	  
transport	  agents.	  	  It	  considers	  that	  the	  dignity	  of	  the	  country	  and	  its	  own	  
welfare	  require	  that	  it	  should	  occupy	  all	  these	  posts.	  	  From	  now	  on	  it	  will	  
insist	  that	  all	  the	  big	  foreign	  companies	  should	  pass	  through	  its	  hands,	  
	  
	  
whether	  these	  companies	  wish	  to	  keep	  on	  their	  connexions	  with	  the	  
country,	  or	  to	  open	  it	  up.	  The	  national	  middle	  class	  discovers	  its	  historic	  
mission:	  that	  of	  intermediary.	  
Seen	  through	  its	  eyes,	  its	  mission	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  
transforming	  the	  nation;	  it	  consists,	  prosaically,	  of	  being	  the	  transmission	  
line	  between	  the	  nation	  and	  a	  capitalism,	  rampant	  though	  camouflaged,	  
which	  today	  puts	  on	  the	  masque	  of	  neocolonialism.	  (122)	  
	  
In	  Biafra,	  with	  Ojukwu’s	  strong	  encouragement,	  Igbo	  intellectuals	  and	  writers,	  
with	  Achebe	  at	  the	  forefront,	  made	  a	  serious	  attempt	  to	  address	  this	  challenge	  
afresh.	  	  Soyinka,	  who	  was	  Yoruba	  and	  from	  the	  South	  West	  (as	  opposed	  to	  
Igboland	  and	  an	  Easterner	  like	  Achebe)	  made	  an	  attempt	  to	  coordinate	  an	  anti-­‐
war	  movement	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  conflict,	  enlisting	  the	  support	  of	  Biafrans,	  
Nigerians	  and	  many	  other	  public	  figures.	  	  In	  1967	  he	  was	  arrested	  without	  
charge	  by	  Nigeria’s	  Federal	  Military	  Government.	  	  Despite	  a	  high-­‐profile,	  
international	  campaign	  for	  his	  release,	  he	  was	  held	  in	  solitary	  confinement	  until	  
almost	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	  	  The	  historian	  Kenneth	  Onwuka	  Dike,	  who	  had	  
founded	  and	  directed	  the	  Nigerian	  National	  Archives	  in	  the	  1950s,	  used	  his	  
expertise	  as	  former	  vice	  chancellor	  at	  Ibadan	  to	  help	  set	  up	  the	  University	  of	  
Biafra.	  
In	  Achebe’s	  account,	  the	  new	  nation	  was	  named	  a	  ‘Republic’	  in	  full	  
consciousness	  of	  that	  word’s	  meaning.	  	  It	  was	  to	  be	  ‘a	  state	  in	  which	  the	  supreme	  
power	  rests	  in	  the	  body	  of	  citizens	  entitled	  to	  vote	  and	  is	  exercised	  by	  
representatives	  chosen	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  by	  them’	  (143).	  	  When	  Ojukwu	  
asked	  Achebe	  to	  convene	  a	  group	  of	  intellectuals	  to	  codify	  the	  principles	  Biafra	  
was	  to	  embody,	  many	  leading	  thinkers	  welcomed	  the	  opportunity	  to	  put	  their	  
talents	  at	  the	  service	  of	  their	  nation.	  
	   The	  historian	  Chieka	  Ifemesia	  brought	  expertise	  on	  British	  colonialism	  in	  
Nigeria	  and,	  like	  Achebe,	  was	  a	  strong	  advocate	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  indigenous	  
African	  political	  thought.	  	  Ikenna	  Nzimiro	  was	  an	  expert	  in	  Igbo	  traditional	  
culture.	  	  In	  The	  Education	  of	  a	  British	  Protected	  Child	  and	  elsewhere,	  Achebe	  has	  
written	  extensively	  of	  the	  democratic	  dynamics	  of	  traditional	  culture	  among	  the	  
Igbo	  before	  colonialism,	  and	  it	  is	  evident	  in	  The	  Ahiara	  Declaration	  that	  the	  
	  
	  
group	  wanted	  that	  meritocratic	  and	  egalitarian	  ethos	  to	  be	  clearly	  reflected	  in	  
Biafra’s	  defining	  statement.	  	  Emeka	  Aniagolu	  was	  a	  Justice	  who	  was	  to	  become	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  renowned	  lawmakers	  in	  West	  Africa.	  	  Ifegwu	  Eke,	  Biafran	  
Minister	  of	  Information,	  was	  a	  young	  intellectual	  who	  had	  received	  his	  doctorate	  
in	  agricultural	  economics	  at	  Harvard	  in	  1966.	  	  Eyo	  Ndem	  was	  a	  political	  
sociologist	  formerly	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Nigeria.	  	  The	  committee	  secretary,	  
Emanuel	  Obiechina,	  was	  a	  literary	  historian	  specialising	  in	  indigenous	  West	  
African	  literatures.	  	  Biographer	  Ezenwa-­‐Ohaeto	  records	  that	  as	  chairman,	  
Achebe	  was	  mandated	  by	  Ojukwu	  to	  co-­‐opt	  any	  member	  of	  the	  public	  to	  give	  
evidence	  before	  the	  committee.	  	  Chukwuemeke	  Ike,	  the	  novelist	  who	  would	  
write	  an	  evocative	  portrait	  of	  idealism,	  violence	  and	  violation	  in	  the	  Biafran	  war	  
in	  Sunset	  at	  Dawn	  (1976),	  was	  one	  of	  those	  called.	  	  In	  interview,	  Ifemesia	  reveals	  
interesting	  detail	  about	  Achebe’s	  committee	  and	  the	  dialogic	  way	  it	  pursued	  its	  
work:	  
	  
[E]verything	  about	  the	  community	  was	  discussed,	  with	  people	  making	  
suggestions.	  Recommendations	  were	  also	  made	  which	  people	  took	  home	  to	  
their	  units.	  The	  meeting	  of	  the	  committee	  was	  a	  two-­‐way	  thing	  for	  the	  
members	  also	  brought	  recommendations	  from	  their	  units.	  Ojukwu	  as	  the	  
Patron	  always	  attended	  the	  meetings.	  There	  is	  scarcely	  any	  meeting	  he	  did	  
not	  attend.	  (Ohaeto,	  140)	  
	  
As	  Chukwuma	  Azuonye	  recalls	  in	  his	  later	  ‘Reminiscences’	  (1989),	  a	  tangible	  
creative	  excitement	  surrounded	  the	  community	  of	  Umuahia	  while	  The	  Ahiara	  
Declaration	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  being	  composed.	  	  ‘With	  the	  fall	  of	  Aba,’	  he	  
writes,	  authors	  and	  artists	  ‘converged	  at	  New	  Town	  Tavern,	  Umuahia,	  where	  we	  
held	  many	  fruitful	  poetry	  reading	  sessions	  over	  palm	  wine,	  chicken	  and	  odudu.	  	  
Umuahia	  gave	  birth	  to	  some	  of	  the	  finest	  poetry	  of	  the	  civil	  war.’	  	  Writers	  and	  
artists	  braved	  Nigerian	  air	  raids	  over	  the	  town	  which	  ‘had	  become	  menacingly	  
more	  frequent	  and	  intense	  with	  gruesome	  bombing	  and	  strafing	  of	  Biafran	  
towns’	  (Azuonye	  23,	  quoted	  by	  Ohaeto	  141).	  	  Amid	  the	  mounting	  violence,	  
Achebe	  writes	  in	  his	  memoir,	  ‘an	  explosion	  of	  musical,	  lyrical,	  and	  poetic	  
creativity	  and	  artistry’	  (151)	  overtook	  Biafra.	  	  On	  the	  day	  in	  June	  1969	  when	  
	  
	  
Ojukwu	  delivered	  The	  Ahiara	  Declaration	  as	  a	  public	  address,	  Achebe	  recalls	  his	  
brother	  Frank’s	  description	  of	  the	  event,	  ‘odika	  si	  gbabia	  agbaba’	  [it	  was	  as	  if	  we	  
were	  dancing	  to	  his	  words].	  	  His	  account	  captures	  the	  moment	  with	  simple	  
intensity.	  	  ‘People	  listened	  from	  wherever	  they	  were.	  	  It	  sounded	  right	  to	  them:	  
freedom,	  quality,	  self-­‐determination,	  excellence.	  	  Ojukwu	  read	  it	  beautifully	  that	  
day’	  (149).	  	  
	   During	  the	  Biafran	  conflict,	  nevertheless,	  Achebe	  himself	  found	  that	  he	  
was	  hardly	  able	  to	  function	  as	  a	  creative	  writer,	  producing	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  
short	  poems	  over	  the	  entire	  course	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  only	  substantial	  
work	  published	  bearing	  Achebe’s	  name	  during	  the	  civil	  war	  was	  the	  children’s	  
story	  How	  the	  Leopard	  Got	  His	  Claws.	  	  Soon	  after	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  war,	  he	  and	  
the	  poet	  Christopher	  Okigbo	  began	  to	  discuss	  the	  importance	  of	  providing	  
educational	  materials	  for	  Biafran	  children,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  suitable	  stories	  
available	  for	  them.	  	  In	  an	  entrepreneurial	  spirit,	  the	  two	  men	  founded	  the	  Citadel	  
Press	  in	  a	  small	  building	  in	  Enugu	  partly	  to	  address	  this	  need.	  	  Among	  the	  first	  
manuscripts	  they	  received	  was	  a	  story	  by	  the	  established	  children’s	  author	  John	  
Iroaganachi,	  based	  on	  the	  proverb	  ‘How	  the	  Dog	  Became	  a	  Domesticated	  Animal,’	  
and	  in	  an	  editing	  job	  that	  became	  a	  fundamental	  rewriting,	  this	  was	  the	  text	  that	  
became	  Leopard.	  	  Across	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  there	  are	  many	  iterations	  on	  the	  
popular	  tale	  Iroaganachi	  had	  chosen.	  	  The	  central	  motif	  they	  hinge	  on,	  as	  Ernest	  
Emenyonu	  	  writes,	  is	  that	  of	  a	  dog	  who	  is	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  animal	  community	  
because	  of	  his	  too-­‐trusting	  nature,	  and	  accepts	  domestic	  subordination	  in	  the	  
house	  of	  man.	  	  For	  Achebe	  and	  Okigbo,	  the	  metaphorics	  of	  this	  narrative,	  and	  in	  
particular	  the	  central	  theme	  of	  the	  dog’s	  subservience,	  seemed	  ill	  suited	  to	  the	  
conditions	  of	  their	  times.	  	  While	  Okigbo	  became	  more	  and	  more	  involved	  in	  
armed	  struggle	  against	  the	  Nigerian	  Federation	  (he	  was	  killed	  in	  action	  
defending	  the	  city	  of	  Nsukka	  in	  1967)	  Achebe	  set	  to	  work	  to	  transform	  the	  
manuscript	  into	  something	  very	  different.	  	  In	  his	  final	  published	  text	  (in	  which	  he	  
and	  Iroaganachi	  are	  cited	  as	  joint	  authors)	  the	  dog	  who	  is	  destined	  to	  be	  
domesticated	  is	  marked	  out	  from	  the	  other	  animals,	  not	  for	  his	  loyalty	  or	  
gullibility,	  but	  for	  his	  sharp	  teeth	  and	  selfish	  nature.	  	  The	  tale	  is	  set	  in	  an	  Edenic	  
space	  in	  which	  even	  the	  leopard	  ,	  who	  rules	  gently	  and	  wisely	  over	  the	  forest,	  has	  
	  
	  
no	  need	  for	  teeth	  or	  claws.	  	  When	  rain	  begins	  to	  fall,	  the	  animals	  work	  together	  
to	  build	  themselves	  a	  fine	  common	  shelter:	  
	  
The	  tortoise	  copied	  the	  pattern	  on	  his	  back	  and	  made	  the	  plan	  of	  the	  roof.	  	  
The	  giant	  rat	  and	  the	  mouse	  dug	  the	  foundation.	  	  Some	  animals	  brought	  
sticks,	  some	  ropes;	  others	  made	  roof	  mats.	  	  As	  they	  built	  they	  built	  the	  
house,	  they	  sang	  many	  happy	  songs.	  	  They	  also	  told	  many	  jokes.	  	  Although	  
they	  worked	  very	  hard,	  everyone	  was	  merry.	  	  After	  many	  weeks,	  they	  
finished	  the	  building.	  	  It	  was	  a	  fine	  building.	  	  The	  animals	  were	  pleased	  with	  
it.	  	  They	  agreed	  to	  open	  it	  with	  a	  very	  special	  meeting.	  	  On	  the	  opening	  day,	  
the	  animals,	  their	  wives,	  and	  their	  children	  gathered	  in	  the	  hall.	  	  King	  
leopard	  then	  made	  a	  short	  speech.	  	  He	  said:	  ‘This	  hall	  is	  yours	  to	  enjoy.	  	  You	  
worked	  very	  hard	  together	  to	  build	  it.	  	  I	  am	  proud	  of	  you.’	  	  (N.Pag.)	  
	  
The	  dog,	  who	  in	  Achebe’s	  text	  is	  savage	  and	  self-­‐seeking,	  takes	  no	  part	  in	  
building	  the	  common	  shelter,	  but	  uses	  his	  superior	  fighting	  strength	  to	  seize	  it	  
for	  himself	  once	  it	  has	  been	  completed.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  he	  bites	  and	  claws	  the	  
leopard,	  who	  slinks	  away	  into	  the	  forest,	  covered	  with	  blood.	  
	   Thus	  far	  in	  the	  narrative,	  which	  Achebe	  re-­‐titled	  How	  the	  Leopard	  Got	  His	  
Claws,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  his	  version	  allegorises	  the	  Biafran	  story.	  	  In	  
Achebe’s	  perception,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  tribalist	  elements	  which	  had	  taken	  little	  
part	  in	  the	  forging	  of	  independent	  Nigeria	  had	  ended	  up	  taking	  that	  ‘common	  
shelter’	  by	  force,	  wounding	  and	  exiling	  those	  who	  had	  helped	  to	  make	  it	  a	  reality.	  	  
In	  this	  sense,	  what	  Achebe	  does	  next	  with	  his	  narrative	  comes	  as	  something	  of	  a	  
surprise.	  	  Instead	  of	  having	  the	  animals	  follow	  their	  gentle	  king	  into	  exile,	  Achebe	  
depicts	  them	  gathering	  obsequiously	  around	  the	  dog:	  
	  
The	  tortoise	  stood	  up	  and	  said,	  ‘I	  am	  sure	  we	  are	  all	  sorry	  about	  what	  
happened	  to	  the	  leopard.	  	  But	  he	  was	  foolish	  to	  talk	  to	  the	  dog	  the	  way	  he	  
did.	  	  It	  is	  foolish	  to	  annoy	  such	  a	  powerful	  person	  as	  the	  dog.	  	  Let	  us	  make	  
peace	  with	  him.	  	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  you	  others	  think.	  	  But	  I	  think	  he	  should	  
have	  been	  our	  king	  all	  along.	  	  He	  is	  strong;	  he	  is	  handsome.	  	  Let	  us	  go	  on	  




As	  he	  retreats	  into	  the	  forest,	  the	  other	  animals	  pursue	  and	  willingly	  stone	  the	  
leopard.	  	  In	  order	  to	  restore	  his	  position	  of	  power,	  it	  is	  therefore	  the	  peace-­‐
loving,	  exiled	  leopard	  who	  resolves	  to	  call	  on	  man—in	  the	  person	  of	  a	  
blacksmith—and	  with	  his	  help,	  to	  arm	  himself	  with	  a	  fearsome	  array	  of	  metal	  
teeth	  and	  claws.	  	  	  Savaging	  the	  dog	  and	  throwing	  him	  out	  of	  the	  community,	  the	  
leopard	  turns	  in	  anger	  to	  the	  other	  animals:	  ‘You	  miserable	  worms.	  	  You	  
shameless	  cowards.	  	  I	  was	  a	  kind	  and	  gentle	  king,	  but	  you	  turned	  against	  me.	  	  
From	  today	  I	  shall	  rule	  the	  forest	  with	  terror.	  	  The	  life	  of	  the	  forest	  is	  ended.’	  	  The	  
animals	  are	  forced	  to	  pull	  apart	  their	  shelter,	  with	  each	  carrying	  away	  the	  part	  he	  
had	  contributed.	  	  Fearful	  of	  the	  leopard,	  the	  dog	  also	  turns	  to	  man,	  selling	  himself	  
into	  slavery	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  hunter.	  	  As	  the	  story	  ends,	  the	  animals	  are	  
locked	  in	  conflict,	  killing	  each	  other	  and	  suffering	  death	  at	  the	  hunter’s	  hands.	  
	   From	  a	  critical	  point	  of	  view,	  what	  is	  particularly	  striking	  about	  the	  
narrative	  turns	  in	  Leopard	  is	  the	  ambivalence	  they	  hint	  at—something	  
rigorously	  excluded	  from	  The	  Ahiara	  Declaration.	  	  In	  young	  children’s	  fiction,	  
generic	  conventions	  that	  are	  almost	  universally	  observed	  include	  the	  
requirements	  that	  justice	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  done	  and	  that	  the	  young	  reader	  is	  offered	  
clear	  closure.	  	  Even	  on	  the	  literal	  level,	  however,	  Leopard	  signally	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  
these	  expectations,	  closing	  instead	  on	  a	  note	  of	  disquiet.	  	  On	  the	  level	  of	  its	  
allegorical	  commentary	  on	  the	  Biafran	  struggle,	  similarly,	  what	  Achebe’s	  story	  
imparts	  is	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  unease	  about	  the	  course	  of	  the	  civil	  war	  and	  the	  
trajectory	  on	  which	  the	  secessionists	  had	  set	  themselves.	  	  Instead	  of	  shedding	  his	  
unnatural	  weapons	  when	  the	  need	  for	  them	  had	  passed	  by,	  the	  leopard	  is	  shown	  
as	  consumed	  with	  implacable,	  self-­‐destructive	  resentment.	  	  As	  for	  the	  dog,	  while	  
in	  the	  huntsman’s	  company	  he	  will	  be	  free	  to	  feed	  on	  the	  flesh	  of	  his	  fellow	  
animals,	  he	  trades	  this	  privilege	  for	  slavery,	  and	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  consort	  
with	  them	  again	  except	  on	  a	  murderous	  basis.	  	  Locked	  in	  conflict,	  Achebe	  
presents	  the	  animals	  as	  united	  only	  by	  their	  inability	  to	  resist	  the	  power	  of	  ‘their	  
common	  enemy’,	  the	  hunter.	  	  By	  contrast	  to	  the	  society	  of	  harmony	  and	  principle	  
conjured	  by	  The	  Ahiara	  Declaration,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  vision	  Leopard	  offers	  is	  
that	  of	  a	  utopia	  destroyed	  by	  forces	  of	  selfishness,	  cowardice	  and	  revenge	  on	  all	  
	  
	  
sides.	  	  With	  the	  help	  of	  the	  invader	  man,	  the	  animals	  have	  not	  only	  destroyed	  
each	  other,	  but	  passed	  up	  their	  opportunity	  for	  freedom.	  
	   The	  sense	  of	  disquiet,	  or	  ambivalence	  that	  shines	  through	  Achebe’s	  
writing	  in	  Leopard	  is	  something	  that,	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict,	  he	  was	  to	  
meditate	  on	  in	  depth.	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that,	  during	  the	  war	  itself,	  he	  had	  
become	  deeply	  enmeshed	  in	  Ojukwu’s	  regime,	  and	  not	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
writing	  of	  The	  Ahiara	  Declaration.	  	  As	  his	  memoir	  records,	  he	  was	  also	  co-­‐opted	  
to	  a	  propagandist	  operation	  known	  as	  the	  Biafran	  Organization	  of	  Freedom	  
Fighters	  (BOFF),	  whose	  brief	  was	  to	  mediate	  a	  positive	  image	  of	  the	  Biafran	  
army	  to	  its	  people.	  	  The	  Republic	  was,	  from	  the	  very	  outset,	  a	  society	  focused	  on	  
violent	  resistance,	  and	  as	  the	  Chief	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Government	  of	  Biafra	  
Ntieyong	  Udo	  Akpan	  writes	  in	  a	  retrospective	  account	  of	  the	  conflict,	  its	  actions	  
were	  by	  no	  means	  always	  defensible.	  	  When	  minority	  communities	  in	  the	  Niger	  
Delta	  were	  suspected	  of	  aiding	  the	  advance	  of	  the	  Federal	  forces,	  for	  example,	  
‘not	  only	  were	  refugees	  from	  such	  areas	  molested,	  but	  even	  those	  of	  their	  people	  
already	  in	  Biafra	  and	  actively	  helping	  in	  the	  war	  effort	  were	  suspected	  and	  
sometimes	  harassed’	  (157).	  	  In	  the	  border	  areas	  themselves:	  
	  
	  Whole	  villages	  were	  burnt	  and	  individuals	  murdered	  .	  .	  .	  and	  it	  was	  quite	  
shocking	  to	  know	  those	  who	  were	  the	  actual	  leaders	  of	  the	  bloody	  and	  
destructive	  rampage—professional	  men,	  university	  lecturers,	  and	  others.	  	  
The	  Governor	  [Ojukwu]	  himself	  gave	  at	  least	  tacit	  approval	  to	  these	  acts	  of	  
brigandage.	  	  (157)	  	  
	  
In	  the	  Delta	  town	  of	  Igrita,	  soon	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  strategically	  important	  Port	  
Harcourt,	  Akpan	  recalls	  being	  ‘terribly	  shocked	  by	  the	  number	  of	  bodies	  being	  
carted	  into	  mass	  graves—bodies	  of	  persons	  not	  killed	  by	  bullets	  but	  by	  cruel	  
handling’	  (157).	  	  Achebe	  was,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  an	  experienced	  media	  
professional.	  	  However,	  his	  brief	  within	  BOFF	  to	  develop	  an	  ‘education	  strategy’	  
(159)	  aimed	  at	  the	  ideological	  harmonization	  of	  the	  military	  and	  the	  people	  must	  
necessarily	  have	  implied	  some	  ethical	  challenges.	  	  In	  There	  Was	  a	  Country,	  the	  
writer	  is	  notably	  brief	  in	  his	  account	  of	  his	  work	  within	  the	  organization,	  as	  well	  
as	  keen	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  its	  activities.	  	  Only	  ‘[a]fter	  I	  left	  the	  BOFF	  outfit,’	  
	  
	  
he	  claims,	  did	  he	  become	  aware	  ‘that	  it	  was	  engaged	  in	  the	  more	  militaristic	  and	  
controversial	  aspects	  of	  war,	  such	  as	  enemy	  infiltration,	  guerilla	  warfare,	  and	  
propaganda’	  (160).	  
	   Asked	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Kaly	  Ogbaa	  about	  the	  Biafran	  experience	  as	  
late	  as	  1980,	  the	  ambivalence	  we	  see	  both	  here	  and	  in	  Leopard	  was	  something	  
Achebe	  had	  yet	  to	  resolve:	  
	  
In	  a	  revolutionary	  situation,	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  great	  danger,	  in	  an	  institution	  
and	  regime	  of	  violence,	  for	  instance,	  what	  does	  a	  creative	  artist	  do?	  .	  .	  .	  	  I	  
decided	  that	  I	  could	  not	  stand	  aside	  from	  the	  problems	  and	  struggles	  of	  my	  
people	  at	  that	  point	  in	  history.	  	  And	  if	  it	  happened	  again,	  I	  would	  not	  
behave	  differently.	  
	   But	  there	  are	  limitations,	  you	  know.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  that	  kind	  of	  situation	  
there	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  pressure	  to	  think	  alike.	  	  There	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  pressure,	  
maybe,	  to	  surrender	  some	  of	  your	  cherished	  ideals.	  	  There	  may	  even	  be	  the	  
danger	  .	  .	  .	  of	  forgetting	  that	  art	  is	  not	  ‘brother’	  to	  violence.	  .	  .	  .	  	  It’s	  tricky	  to	  
get	  onto	  that	  situation.	  	  I	  cannot	  say	  more	  than	  I	  have	  said,	  but	  I’ll	  simply	  
say	  again	  that	  an	  artist	  has	  to	  have	  his	  wits	  about	  him	  because	  he	  is	  
stepping	  into	  a	  very	  dangerous	  domain.	  	  (71)	  
	  
Soon	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  Achebe	  returned	  to	  the	  offices	  of	  the	  Citadel	  press	  
in	  Enugu,	  a	  city	  that,	  having	  been	  named	  Biafra’s	  capital	  after	  secession,	  had	  
fallen	  to	  the	  Federal	  forces	  in	  October	  1967.	  	  Amid	  the	  other	  buildings	  that	  stood	  
unscathed	  by	  the	  conflict,	  he	  describes	  how	  his	  company’s	  modest	  premises	  had	  
been	  ‘pummeled	  into	  the	  ground,’	  their	  constituent	  parts	  scattered	  and	  
‘pulverized	  as	  if	  with	  a	  jackhammer’	  (185).	  	  For	  Achebe:	  
	  
It	  was	  the	  work	  of	  someone	  or	  some	  people	  with	  an	  ax	  to	  grind.	  	  It	  
appeared	  as	  if	  there	  was	  an	  angry	  mission	  sent	  to	  silence	  the	  Citadel—for	  
having	  the	  audacity	  to	  publish	  How	  the	  Leopard	  Got	  His	  Claws—a	  book	  that	  
challenged	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  Federation’s	  philosophy.	  .	  .	  .	  	  
Having	  had	  a	  few	  too	  many	  homes	  and	  offices	  bombed,	  I	  walked	  away	  from	  




Feeling	  that	  he	  could	  no	  longer	  live	  in	  a	  country	  whose	  reckless	  violence	  he	  had	  
witnessed	  at	  first	  hand,	  Achebe	  went	  into	  exile	  with	  his	  family	  in	  the	  United	  
States.	  	  In	  1972,	  resolving	  that	  he	  could	  no	  longer	  carry	  the	  mantle	  for	  African	  
literary	  development,	  he	  relinquished	  editorship	  of	  The	  African	  Writers	  Series.	  	  
Interviewed	  by	  Onuora	  Ossie	  Enekwe	  for	  Okike	  in	  1976	  on	  his	  return	  to	  Nigeria	  
six	  years	  later,	  Achebe	  reported	  on	  progress	  with	  another	  novel	  project	  which,	  
once	  again	  however,	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  bring	  to	  completion.	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  
civil	  war,	  he	  told	  Enekwe,	  his	  main	  struggle	  was	  with	  ‘the	  problem	  of	  finding	  the	  
kind	  of	  emotional	  and	  artistic	  stability—peace	  of	  mind,	  if	  you	  like—that	  is	  
needed’	  (53).	  	  It	  was	  a	  further	  ten	  years	  before	  he	  was	  able	  to	  break	  his	  novelist’s	  
block.	  
In	  The	  Wretched	  of	  the	  Earth,	  Fanon	  had	  called	  for	  the	  new,	  University	  
educated	  class	  in	  formerly	  colonized	  nations	  ‘to	  put	  itself	  to	  school	  with	  the	  
people,’	  (120)	  dedicating	  their	  talents	  and	  subordinating	  their	  ambitions	  to	  the	  
achievement	  of	  national	  regeneration.	  	  As	  a	  writer	  who	  had	  frequently	  used	  the	  
language	  of	  ‘commitment’	  and	  spoken	  of	  the	  social	  obligations	  of	  intellectuals,	  
Achebe	  was	  provided	  with	  an	  opportunity	  in	  Biafra	  to	  rise	  to	  Fanon’s	  challenge,	  
and	  to	  test	  his	  principles	  in	  practice.	  	  As	  a	  trusted	  member	  of	  Ojukwu’s	  regime,	  
he	  was	  privileged	  to	  help	  shape	  and	  articulate	  the	  core	  values	  of	  an	  idealistic	  
new	  nation,	  as	  it	  struggled	  to	  invent	  and	  sustain	  itself.	  	  What	  is	  also	  clear	  from	  
his	  memoir,	  as	  well	  as	  writings	  and	  interviews	  of	  the	  time,	  however,	  is	  that	  both	  
personally	  and	  professionally,	  the	  Biafran	  experience	  took	  an	  enormous	  toll.	  	  In	  
the	  early	  1960s,	  Achebe	  had	  seemed	  the	  epitome	  of	  productive,	  committed	  
creativity,	  unflinchingly	  determined	  to	  redeem	  his	  people	  from	  colonialism’s	  
damaging	  and	  demeaning	  legacies.	  	  Out	  of	  Biafra,	  he	  emerged	  as	  a	  much	  more	  
troubled	  and	  conflicted	  figure.	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